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Abstract
Background: Hospital mortality is increasingly being regarded as a key indicator of patient safety, yet methodologies for
assessing mortality are frequently contested and seldom point directly to areas of risk and solutions. The aim of our study
was to classify reports of deaths due to unsafe care into broad areas of systemic failure capable of being addressed by
stronger policies, procedures, and practices. The deaths were reported to a patient safety incident reporting system after
mandatory reporting of such incidents was introduced.
Methods and Findings: The UK National Health Service database was searched for incidents resulting in a reported death of
an adult over the period of the study. The study population comprised 2,010 incidents involving patients aged 16 y and
over in acute hospital settings. Each incident report was reviewed by two of the authors, and, by scrutinising the structured
information together with the free text, a main reason for the harm was identified and recorded as one of 18 incident types.
These incident types were then aggregated into six areas of apparent systemic failure: mismanagement of deterioration
(35%), failure of prevention (26%), deficient checking and oversight (11%), dysfunctional patient flow (10%), equipment-
related errors (6%), and other (12%). The most common incident types were failure to act on or recognise deterioration
(23%), inpatient falls (10%), healthcare-associated infections (10%), unexpected per-operative death (6%), and poor or
inadequate handover (5%). Analysis of these 2,010 fatal incidents reveals patterns of issues that point to actionable areas for
improvement.
Conclusions: Our approach demonstrates the potential utility of patient safety incident reports in identifying areas of
service failure and highlights opportunities for corrective action to save lives.
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Introduction
Inpatient deaths are an inevitable outcome for some acutely and
chronically ill patients admitted to hospital. Analyses to uncover
potentially avoidable deaths should be a necessary part of the
surveillance of quality and safety in any healthcare system.
Approaches to assessing unsafe care leading to death can be
categorised into mortality and morbidity reviews [1], case-note
reviews [2,3], and system-wide outlier analysis [4]. In England,
such analyses led to the following: the recognition of major failures
in the standards of care in the children’s heart surgery service at
the Bristol Royal Infirmary [5], the identification of disturbing
levels of poor care and neglect of elderly patients at Stafford
Hospital (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) [6], and an
urgent review of quality of care in 14 hospitals with high mortality
rates [7]. Metrics such as the hospital standardised mortality ratio
and the Summary Hospital-Level Mortality Indicator are now
used to identify hospitals with potential patient safety problems
[4]. However, what these measures cannot easily reveal are the
service shortfalls that may trigger harm.
Presenting comparative data to healthcare organisations in the
form of indices of mortality is of limited value in establishing
avoidable factors in the cause of deaths. If a hospital is not an
outlier for deaths, its management is likely to take the view that
nothing further needs to be done. Alternatively, if it does have
higher than expected mortality, initial investigation will focus on
the validity of the data to try to show that the adverse finding is
artefactual rather than real. The accompanying media pressure
and public interest mean that the accountability stakes for chief
executive officers and health boards are very high, and likely to be
higher if legal criminal sanctions are implemented in the manner
recommended by the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust
Public Inquiry [6]. When a hospital is presented statistically as an
outlier for deaths, invariably a more clinically orientated review
will then be undertaken to explore causes of death and to make
judgements on whether the deaths are indeed ‘‘excessive’’ or
‘‘avoidable’’.
What is missing from these contentious and conflicting
viewpoints is a regular process of looking at the patterns and
trends in deaths to yield actionable findings at the hospital and
national level. Our study examines the deaths in acute hospital
settings that are reported by healthcare staff as patient-safety-
related, rather than routine hospital episode statistics. Relatively
large numbers of these deaths are regularly reported as incidents,
but such data have hardly been mentioned or examined in the
public debates, even though the term ‘‘patient safety’’ has been
repeatedly used by the media and health officials when referring to
hospital mortality levels.
We reviewed all patient safety incident reports of deaths starting
when their reporting became mandatory. The aim of the study
was to classify the reported deaths to identify broad areas of service
failure capable of being addressed by strengthening clinical
policies, procedures, and practices.
Methods
This study was part of a research programme at Imperial
College London funded by the National Health Service (NHS) in
England to develop incident reporting in the NHS. Ethical
approval is in place for this programme from the Health Research
Authority.
The study population was all adult deaths reported by NHS staff
as patient safety incidents from hospitals in England over the
period 1 June 2010 to 31 October 2012, 17 mo in total. 1 June
2010 was chosen as the start date because this was the date
reporting of deaths due to patient safety incidents in the NHS in
England and Wales became mandatory [8]. Prior to that, all
patient safety incidents, whether causing death or otherwise, were
reported on a voluntary basis (this remains the case for incidents
involving no, low, or moderate harm). Between the quarter in
which death reporting became mandatory (1 April 2010–30 June
2010) and the corresponding quarter 2 y later (1 Apr 2012–30
June 2012), overall incident reports increased by 17% (from
278,279 to 325,714) and reported deaths by 30% (from 698 to
912) [9].
Since 2004, staff from all parts of the NHS have been
encouraged to make an incident report of any situation in which
they believe that a patient’s safety was compromised. A ‘‘patient
safety incident’’ is defined as ‘‘any unintended or unexpected
incident which could have, or did, lead to harm for one or more
patients receiving NHS care’’ [10]. Most reports are first made to
a local NHS organisation and then sent in batch returns by the
organisation’s risk manager to the national level. A small number
are made by staff directly to the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS). The information required in each incident report
covers the following: demographic and administrative data; the
circumstances of occurrence; a categorisation of causation; an
assessment of the degree of harm as ‘‘no’’, ‘‘low’’, ‘‘moderate’’,
‘‘severe’’, or ‘‘death’’; and action taken or planned to investigate or
prevent a recurrence. These data are captured in a structured
reporting form, but there is also a section of free text where the
reporter is asked to describe what happened and why they think it
happened. Data are anonymised to remove the names of patients
and staff members. The detailed structure of the database has been
described elsewhere [11].
The national database of patient safety incidents now contains
around 10 million reports. For most of its existence, the NRLS was
managed by an independent agency within the NHS called the
National Patient Safety Agency. The agency was abolished in mid-
2010 by the UK government as part of a cost-cutting policy to
reduce the number of bodies operating at arm’s length from the
government [12,13]. However, the NRLS has continued to
function as before, managed by the same team of staff in a
temporary home until the government decides on its long-term
location.
The database was searched for patient safety incidents resulting
in the reported death of an adult over the period of the study. The
study population comprised a total of 2,010 such incidents
involving patients aged 16 y and over in acute hospital settings.
Incidents of deaths in obstetric and mental health units were
excluded since staff are encouraged to report these to relevant
standing confidential enquiries [14,15].
We used thematic analysis for the qualitative aspects of this
work [16]. Each incident report was reviewed by two of the
authors (L. J. D. and S. S. P.) independently, and, by scrutinising
the structured information together with the free text, a main
reason for the harm was selected and recorded as one of 18
incident types: failure to act on or recognise deterioration; failure
to give ordered treatment or support in a timely way; failure to
observe; inpatient falls; healthcare-associated infections; pressure
sores or decubitus ulcers; suicides; venous thromboembolism
(VTE) or pulmonary embolus; medication error; misinterpretation
or mishandling of test results; unexpected per-operative death;
inappropriate discharge; poor or inadequate handover; unavail-
ability of intensive treatment unit beds; necessary equipment failed
or faulty; necessary equipment misused or misread by practitioner;
Patient-Safety-Related Hospital Deaths in England
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necessary equipment not available; and other. The incident type
categories were created based on an inductive approach [17] from
the data, and the final terminology used for the categories was
agreed upon by the authors based on prior knowledge of unsafe
practices in the NHS. Each category reflected the most prominent
contributory factors resulting in the occurrence of the incident.
The assumption was that an approach of one-to-one mapping
would be possible. Saturation was achieved after a review of 500
incidents. The final coding framework was then applied to all the
incidents. A third reviewer was selected as an arbitrator where
discrepancies arose between the classification of incidents by the
two coders (L. J. D. and S. S. P.). Agreement between the two
coders in classifying the incidents was good (Kappa= 0.87). Root
cause analyses were not available.
After this thematic analysis, all incident reports were indexed
and mapped onto the 18 categories and further collapsed into six
areas of systemic failure. The incident types were grouped into this
second level as shown in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics were calculated, and examples of free text
extracted. The free text extracts were edited to spell out
abbreviations and acronyms in full, and to remove any potential
identification details.
Results
The types of incidents relating to mismanagement of deterio-
rating, acutely ill patients made up the single largest category of
systemic service failure, accounting for 35% (705/2,010) of deaths
(Table 1). The extract of free text from one of the incident reports
in this area of service failure (Table 2) is typical of the other reports
that staff, usually nurses, made. These incidents involved a mixture
of factors that related to inappropriate clinical handling of acutely
ill patients. Initial observations were often delayed or incomplete,
and the intervals between subsequent observations were inappro-
priately long. Clinical review was often not timely, and/or
decisions about potentially life-saving interventions were not
made.
As Table 1 also shows, amongst the incidents classified as
failures of prevention (26%, 530/2,010), falls and healthcare-
associated infections were the most frequent incident types,
between them making up one in five of the reported deaths.
The extract of free text from a sample incident (Table 2)
demonstrates that the reporter was concerned that a national
policy to prevent harm—in this case, VTE—had not been
implemented, which resulted in the death of a patient.
Deficiencies in checking and oversight accounted for 218/2,010
(11%) of all incidents resulting in death. This heterogeneous group
of systemic failures includes errors associated with unexpected per-
operative death (6%, 124/2,010), medication errors (3%, 60/
2,010), and misinterpretation or mishandling of test results (2%,
34/2,010) (Table 1). The most frequently occurring incident type
in this area of service failure was unexpected per-operative death,
and descriptions of events of this type included patients dying
unexpectedly on the operating table or from complications that
Table 1. Patient-safety-related adult deaths in NHS acute hospital settings: analysis of areas of systemic service failure.
Area of Service Failure Incident Type Number of Incidents Percent of Incidents
Mismanagement of deterioration Failure to act on or recognise deterioration 462 23%
Failure to give ordered treatment/support in a timely way 130 6%
Failure to observe 113 6%
All mismanagement of deterioration 705 35%
Failure of prevention Inpatient falls 206 10%
Healthcare-associated infections 202 10%
Pressure sores/decubitus ulcers 7 ,1%
Suicides 28 1%
VTE/pulmonary embolus 87 4%
All failure of prevention 530 26%
Deficient checking and oversight Medication error 60 3%
Misinterpretation or mishandling of test results 34 2%
Unexpected per-operative death (immediately/within 24 hours) 124 6%
All deficient checking and oversight 218 11%
Dysfunctional patient flow Inappropriate discharge 78 4%
Poor/inadequate handover 94 5%
Unavailability of intensive treatment unit beds 25 1%
All dysfunctional patient flow 197 10%
Equipment-related errors Necessary equipment failed or faulty 16 ,1%
Necessary equipment misused or misread by practitioner 79 4%
Necessary equipment not available 22 1%
All equipment-related errors 117 6%
Other 243 12%
Total 2,010 100%
Covers a 17-mo period from 1 June 2010 to 31 October 2012, during which reports of deaths were mandatory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001667.t001
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resulted in a re-operation within 24 h. Medication errors occurred
at various points—administering, prescribing, and dispensing.
Misinterpretation or mishandling of test results encompassed those
incidents involving misinterpretation of findings, failure to take
action on serious abnormalities, and neglect of follow-through (of
the kind illustrated by the free text incident extract provided in
Table 2).
Ten percent (197/2,010) of the incidents (Table 1) were judged
to relate to dysfunctions in the way that patients flowed into,
within, and out of the hospital. Temporary or sustained shortages
of intensive care capacity were associated with one in 100 deaths
reported, whilst 9% (172/2010) of incidents related to decisions
and exchange of information on transfer between hospital
departments, or from the hospital to the community. The sample
incident extracted in Table 2 has features similar to others in that
the reporter clearly attributes an inappropriate clinical decision to
discharge a patient to clinical inexperience.
Failures in medical equipment, its misuse by practitioners, or its
absence when urgently needed were associated with 6% (117/
2,010) of deaths reported as patient safety incidents. The extract
from an incident report in this area of systemic service failure
(Table 2) shows how death resulted from a failure to use a standard
piece of equipment according to the required procedure.
Overall, 12% (243/2,010) of incidents could not be classified.
The category ‘‘other’’ contained a mixture of reports, some where
the details were highly specific but did not fit any of the incident
types (such as the serious mortuary mix-up described in the
incident report extract in Table 2), and many others where the
report was too vague or incomplete to deduce what the reporter
was trying to convey.
Discussion
How to achieve clarity on the utility of databases of patient
safety incident reports remains an open debate [18–20]. One view
holds that reporting systems are of value only in detecting rare
events because extensive under-reporting prevents broader con-
clusions being made about the degree of harm to patients. An
alternative view asserts that data from incident reports, despite
their limitations, are the only data source through which to
characterise harm so as to highlight areas of action to improve
patient safety. Both views are important in that the true rate of
harm cannot be established from reporting systems alone, yet
information on types of harm is invaluable for identifying key areas
of risk amenable to intervention. At the reporting level, it is also
unclear to some reporters what sort of incidents should be reported
and the level of detail required so that useful reporting and
learning can occur locally and nationally. Whilst a formal
definition is available to guide reporting to the database used in
our study [8], it is very broad. This certainly keeps the threshold
for deciding whether to report low, but perhaps does not
encourage reflection and focus on precision when formulating
the content of a report. Our analysis takes account of the
limitations of incident reports but shows how, despite these, value
can be extracted to yield clear insights into important sources of
unsafe care at the system level.
Our finding that mismanagement of deterioration of acutely ill
patients was a feature in more than a third of the patient-safety-
related reported deaths points to an area of concern needing
attention in the NHS. The underlying factors identified in previous
NHS audits of acutely ill patients—weak organisation, inadequate
knowledge, lack of clinical urgency, poor supervision, and failure
to seek advice—echo the features of many of the incident reports
that we reviewed [21,22]. The National Patient Safety Agency
highlighted the need to focus on deteriorating patients in 2007
[23]. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
advocated several changes to this area of care: better recording of
physiological variables, early warning scores, senior clinical input,
and better handover [24]. In 2012, the Royal College of
Physicians promoted its National Early Warning Score as a
replacement for the multiplicity of such scores currently being used
in the NHS [25]. Different scoring systems cause ambiguity and
potential confusion amongst clinical decision-makers, particularly
when staff move from hospital to hospital. A standardised early
warning score, if mandated by the NHS, could save lives by
Table 2. Extracts of free text from patient safety incident reports of death.
Area of Service Failure Extracts of Free Text from Patient Safety Incident Reports of Death
Mismanagement of deterioration Presented to the emergency department at 1130 with abdominal pain, vomiting, confusion and a fall. Not triaged until 1215.
At this point did not have a spot blood sugar check. Several hours later returned from having a chest X-ray that showed air
under the diaphragm. Seen by surgeons. Observations appear not to have been repeated until 1950. Now has a blood sugar
of 1.3 mmol/l and a blood pressure of 59/19 mm Hg. Referred to the intensive treatment unit. Intensive treatment unit
concerned that the patient may have been shocked and hypoglycaemic for several hours before this was recognised.
Failure of prevention Patient died from pulmonary embolus in hospital on day 12 of admission. On admission, VTE risk score was not performed
which would have indicated that Fragmin [low molecular weight heparin] at a prophylactic dose should have been
prescribed.
Deficient checking and oversight Patient had chest X-ray and presented again, a year later, with a bronchial carcinoma and widespread disease and died five
days later. Lung cancer judged to be present in the original chest X-ray and this was not included within the radiology
report. The patient received no follow-up.
Dysfunctional patient flow Sustained head and wrist injury whilst at garden centre. No loss of consciousness but had vomited once. Currently on
warfarin. Glasgow Coma Scale = 15/15 on arrival in the emergency department. Seen by locum doctor; X-ray of the wrist did
not reveal any fractures. No anticoagulation checks or request made for a CT scan. Discharged with minor head injury
advice. Patient returned a day later with reduced consciousness and a CT scan revealed an intracranial bleed.
Equipment-related errors Elderly patient with rheumatic heart disease who had a redo mitral valve repair. Decision made to replace Ryles nasogastric
tube (for gastric drainage) with fine bore nasogastric tube. Chest X-ray reviewed by intensive treatment unit registrar and
nasogastric tube deemed to be in correct position. Feeding commenced. Patient went into respiratory deterioration, was
reintubated and ventilated. Nasogastric tube found to be in trachea and feeding stopped.
Other Relatives informed that a body due for release for burial (Body A) was in fact that of another individual (Body B). Both bodies
had been kept frozen for a long period of time and confusion over the correct body to be released had occurred.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001667.t002
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ensuring more uniform identification of acutely ill patients. In
addition, more timely responses (e.g., in the form of rapid response
teams) will be needed to rescue acutely deteriorating patients.
Despite clear policy statements (Patient Safety First [http://www.
patientsafetyfirst.nhs.uk/], 1000 Lives Plus [http://www.
1000livesplus.wales.nhs.uk/], [26]) to encourage preventive pro-
grammes in well-established areas of harm—healthcare-associated
infection, falls, VTE, inpatient suicides outside mental health
services, and pressure ulcers—our data show that almost a quarter
of all adult deaths reported as patient safety related are still
associated with these causes. Progress has been made in some areas.
Between 2006 and 2011, the prevalence of healthcare-associated
infections in the NHS was reduced from 8.2% to 6.4%, and the
prevalence of two key infections, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus and Clostridium difficile declined by 70% [27]. Since 2010, NHS
hospitals have been required to implement measures to prevent
VTE [28]. The quality of implementation across the whole service
has not been established, but exemplar centres have shown that
screening 95% of all patients is feasible [29]. The number of VTE-
related deaths during the 17-mo period of our study—87—falls well
below the widely promulgated estimate of deaths from this cause
that triggered such concern that preventing VTE was made a
national priority [30]. Potential explanations for this lower number
of actual deaths could be the success of the VTE prevention
programme in the NHS, or that the baseline assumption for VTE
incidence was erroneously high, an observation that would be
consistent with extrapolation of US epidemiological data to the UK
population [31].
In contrast to the national priority given to reducing infection,
VTE, and pressure sores, national priority has not been given in
the same way to falls, a seemingly intractable cause of harm.
Almost 208,000 inpatient falls are reported to the NHS every year
[32]. We have shown that 10% of all adult deaths reported as
being patient safety related are associated with falls. Yet,
prevention of falls remains an elusive target for most hospitals,
despite their associated risk and cost. High-risk patients need to be
identified and interventions targeted accordingly—the use of
ward-specific fall run-charts, reducing environmental hazards,
providing personal alarms, and communicating patient risk across
multidisciplinary teams can help to ameliorate this problem. Better
staffing levels could also help [33].
Almost 11% of deaths in our study were due to deficient
checking and oversight: unexpected per-operative death, misin-
terpretation or mishandling of test results, or a medication error.
Avoidable factors and potential interventions in unexpected per-
operative death and medication error have been extensively
studied [34,35], although they remain a regular feature of incident
reports. Significant work has been undertaken in the area of
medication errors, with interventions that have focused on
frequent checks, pharmacist review, technologies, and information
systems. These all have been introduced and evaluated, with
mixed results. The whole field of misdiagnosis has remained
under-researched until recently, and work is badly needed to
establish the scale and scope of harm arising from this source, and
the claims made for decision support technology as a way to
reduce it [36]. However, we accept that our estimates from our
classification might be conservative because failure to diagnose
permeates various incident types.
Our finding of deaths associated with poor or inadequate
handover and inappropriate discharge is not novel, and, indeed,
transfers across boundaries are well-documented sources of risk in
other sectors [37] as well as health [38]. For example, the erroneous
discharge of patients from emergency departments back to the
community is an ongoing problem that highlights unresolved
dilemmas in clinical training as well as the level and seniority of
staffing in these departments [39]. The precise reasons why
erroneous discharge occurs require detailed local investigation.
However, a more risk-averse approach to discharge would have
resource implications arising from a greater number of precaution-
ary admissions.
The NHS needs to pay greater attention to the equipment it
procures, and its subsequent maintenance and proper use. We
consider 117 (6%) deaths attributable to equipment-related failures
to represent an important area the NHS can correct. The idea that
patients should still be dying in the NHS from misplaced
nasogastric tubes (our sample incident report in Table 2) despite
several rounds of national guidance [40,41] should itself be a
source of concern for a service setting its sights on zero harm. The
occurrence of faulty or failed equipment, a feature of some of the
reports of death in our study—as well as our earlier work that
showed that the number of device-related errors was rising
compared with user-related errors in laparoscopic cholecystectomy
[42]—must surely be one of the easier targets for risk elimination.
The inquiry into poor standards of care at Stafford Hospital [6]
produced 290 recommendations in a searching assessment of the
functioning of the entire NHS system in protecting patients and
assuring the quality and safety of their care. Recommendations
include the need to ‘‘develop and make more information
available’’ from the NRLS, to ‘‘establish metrics’’ relevant to
providing ‘‘strategic oversight’’ of patient safety, and to ‘‘enhance
the use and analysis’’ of healthcare information. Our methodology
makes substantial contributions in these areas. First, we have
extracted more value than currently exists from the patient safety
incident reports. Second, we have presented a framework of
analysis that allows for strategic insight and surveillance to identify
important systemic failures in the safety of care. Third, we address
one of the underpinning themes of the Stafford Hospital inquiry:
that greater visibility and transparency of information is essential
to allow the public and patients to understand the risks of care.
Strengths and Limitations
Any incident reporting system is limited by data quality,
particularly the extent of under-reporting, selective reporting, and
incomplete reporting. This has been a criticism of the NRLS in the
past. However, our study population was deaths in a time period
after reporting of incidents associated with death and severe harm
became mandatory in the NHS. That is not to say that all such
incidents will have been reported, but our study is likely to have
captured a higher proportion than would have previously been the
case. Moreover, the aim of our study was not to determine the
absolute incidence of severe harm, but to identify situations where
frontline staff perceived their patient’s care to have been unsafe
and associated with death. Although root cause analysis may have
been available to supplement these incident reports, we lacked the
resources to undertake a full review of these reports as we would
have been swamped with very granular details that would likely
have been difficult to aggregate. Alternatively, had we simply
relied on the structured categories of causation in the reports, we
would have been reliant on several hundred local reporters’ and
risk managers’ opinions on the causes of the incidents.
Instead, our analysis takes account of those local perceptions, but
is also based on detailed study of the free text (narrative) section of
the incident reports. We acknowledge that the ‘‘true’’ cause of an
incident is invariably multi-factorial, and we do not claim to have
exposed the ‘‘true’’ cause. That would be impossible without
detailed, and in many cases extremely extensive, investigation.
However, we believe our approach is important in that it has
identified major systemic features of clinical services that seem to be
Patient-Safety-Related Hospital Deaths in England
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generating harm serious enough to cause death. It is a pragmatic
rather than purist approach to using data conscientiously reported
by concerned frontline staff that would otherwise lie fallow.
In the identification and characterisation of the incident types in
the second level of our classification, there is at times the potential
for some overlap between categories. For example, the incident type
‘‘pressure sores’’ has been placed into the ‘‘failure of prevention’’
area of systematic failure. It could be argued that if a hospital failed
to document skin breakdown on admission (a factor that can result
in pressure sores), the incident would better belong to the ‘‘deficient
checking and oversight’’ area of systemic failure.
In our experience, incident reporting data cannot be used
routinely to distinguish ‘‘avoidable’’ from ‘‘unavoidable’’ harm,
although many reports, by the nature of the incidents, clearly fall
into the former category. What is needed is recognition that when
there is an accumulation of incidents in a particular area of care,
this should trigger a response to ensure that patients are protected.
The large number of incident reports and the urgency of many of
the situations described means that the depth of investigation
required to determine ‘‘avoidability’’ in each such case is just not
feasible. For example, without standardised root cause analysis of
each case, we cannot determine how many of the 2,010 deaths
would have been avoided, but we can assume that the level of
concern expressed by the staff making the reports has highlighted
major problems. Moreover, the events described should not be
happening in a modern, high-quality health service. Indeed, the
staff reporting had a high enough level of concern to suggest that
most of the deaths had an element of preventability.
Conclusion
We have shown that analysing a national reporting system
generating a very high volume of patient safety incident reports
can point to recurring and actionable findings. The nature of the
deaths occurring, associated as they are with common processes of
care, should be a matter of great concern to a modern health
service targeting ‘‘continuing reduction in harm’’ [43]. The
positive feature of this finding is that there is an opportunity for
corrective action to save many lives. The use of patient safety data
in this way needs to become an everyday routine within the NHS
at the national and local level, as well as have a role in shaping
clinical decisions. Thus, there is an important role for specialty-
specific teams or mortality review committees [44] to review their
own incidents and implement solutions locally, and to draw
attention to generalisable, national risk reduction action. Use of a
classification system, such as the one proposed in this study, would
allow hospital boards and clinicians to identify and prioritise areas
for greater scrutiny and intervention. At present, there is a
disconnect between national harm reduction initiatives, areas of
concern that hospital staff see as important, and feedback between
these levels. Focusing on actionable findings may be one way
forward.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Being admitted to the hospital is worrying for
patients and for their relatives. Will the patient recover or die
in the hospital? Some seriously ill patients will inevitably die,
but in an ideal world, no one should die in the hospital
because of inadequate or unsafe care (an avoidable death).
No one should die, for example, because healthcare
professionals fail to act on signs that indicate a decline in a
patient’s clinical condition. Hospital mortality (death) is often
regarded as a key indicator of patient safety in hospitals, and
death rate indicators such as the ‘‘hospital standardized
mortality ratio’’ (the ratio of the actual number of acute in-
hospital deaths to the expected number of in-hospital
deaths) are widely used to monitor and improve hospital
safety standards. In England, for example, a 2012 report that
included this measure as an indicator of hospital perfor-
mance led to headlines of ‘‘worryingly high’’ hospital death
rates and to a review of the quality of care in the hospitals
with the highest death rates.
Why Was This Study Done? Hospital standardized
mortality ratios and other measures of in-patient mortality
can be misleading because they can, for example, reflect the
burden of disease near the hospital rather than the hospital’s
quality of care or safety levels. Moreover, comparative data
on hospital mortality rates are of limited value in identifying
areas of risk to patients or solutions to the problem of
avoidable deaths. In this study, to identify areas of service
failure amenable to improvement through strengthened
clinical policies, procedures, and practices, the researchers
undertake a thematic analysis of deaths in hospitals in
England that were reported by healthcare staff to a
mandatory patient-safety-related incident reporting system.
Since 2004, staff in the UK National Health Service (the NHS
comprises the publicly funded healthcare systems in
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) have been
encouraged to report any unintended or unexpected
incident in which they believe a patient’s safety was
compromised. Since June 2010, it has been mandatory for
staff in England and Wales to report deaths due to patient-
safety-related incidents. A thematic analysis examines pat-
terns (‘‘themes’’) within nonnumerical (qualitative) data.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? By searching
the NHS database of patient-safety-related incidents, the
researchers identified 2010 incidents that occurred between
1 June 2010 and 31 October 2012 that resulted in the death
of adult patients in acute hospital settings. By scrutinizing
the structured information in each incident report and the
associated free text in which the reporter described what
happened and why they think it happened, the researchers
classified the reports into 18 incident categories. These
categories fell into six broad areas of systemic failure—
mismanagement of deterioration (35% of incidents), failure
of prevention (26%), deficient checking and oversight (11%),
dysfunctional patient flow (10%), equipment-related errors
(6%), and other (12%, incidents where the problem under-
lying death was unclear). Management of deterioration, for
example, included the incident categories ‘‘failure to act on
or recognize deterioration’’ (23% of reported incidents),
‘‘failure to give ordered treatment/support in a timely
manner,’’ and ‘‘failure to observe.’’ Failure of prevention
included the incident categories ‘‘falls’’ (10% of reported
incidents), ‘‘healthcare-associated infections’’ (also 10% of
reported incidents), ‘‘pressure sores,’’ ‘‘suicides,’’ and ‘‘deep
vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism.’’
What Do These Findings Mean? Although the accuracy
of these findings may be limited by data quality and by other
aspects of the study design, they reveal patterns of patient-
safety-related deaths in hospitals in England and highlight
areas of healthcare that can be targeted for improvement.
The finding that the mismanagement of deterioration of
acutely ill patients is involved in a third of patient-safety-
related deaths identifies an area of particular concern in the
NHS and, potentially, in other healthcare systems. One way
to reduce deaths associated with the mismanagement of
deterioration, suggest the researchers, might be to introduce
a standardized early warning score to ensure uniform
identification of this population of patients. The researchers
also suggest that more effort should be put into designing
programs to prevent falls and other incidents and into
ensuring that these programs are effectively implemented.
More generally, the classification system developed here has
the potential to help hospital boards and clinicians identify
areas of patient care that require greater scrutiny and
intervention and thereby save the lives of many hospital
patients.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001667.
N The NHS provides information about patient safety,
including a definition of a patient safety incident and
information on reporting patient safety incidents
N The NHS Choices website includes several ‘‘Behind the
Headlines’’ articles that discuss patient safety in hospitals,
including an article that discusses the 2012 report of high
hospital death rates in England, ‘‘Fit for the Future?’’ and
another that discusses the Keogh review of the quality of
care in the hospitals with highest death rates
N The US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
provides information on patient safety in the US
N Wikipedia has pages on thematic analysis and on patient
safety (note that Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia
that anyone can edit; available in several languages)
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